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The question to be answered in this discussion is: "Are viable
democratic government and effective foreign policy irreconcilable aims ? "
The viewpoint of this writer is that they are not irreconcilable aims but
insofar as they ere reconcilable, the answer is Qualified depending on the
absoluteness or purity of the attending modifying terms
.
This introduction will serve three purposes; first, to define
"effective foreign policy" and "viable democratic government" and to es-
tablish these definitions as premises in the argument; second, to establish
the precincts within which the discussion will be conducted; third, to set
forth the format and major divisions of the discussion.
Effective foreign policy in its broadest sense is that foreign
policy which contributes directly to those objectives which sustain, en-
hance, or fortify national interest(s). It generates commitments and
emanates from principles within the spectrum of the idealistic absolute good
and the "non-perfectionist ethic." 1 In a much narrower sense, effective
foreign policy merely contributes in l positive manner to the national in-
terests)
.
Viable democratic government is that government possessed of a
system and process th.it arrives at decisions thKjugfc debate and peaceful
reconciliation of differences in consonance with the majority and in con-
sideration of the rights of the minority.
1 nold vVolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns






The foregoing definitions, as premises of the argument, are
complemented by another premise, namely, that national interest(s) does
exist. National interest though identified as being too vague, as some-
thing intangible, as a device for the undisciplined mind, as a propagan-
dists tool for furthering unpopular commitments or policies, exists as a
scalar measurement of self-preservation, security, and well-being.
In order to set the bounds within which this discussion will be
conducted , democratic government and foreign policy will be used in the
arican context of the terms and, therefore, American democratic govern-
ment and American foreign policy will be examined.
This writer will use these terms to establish that American
foreign policy has been and is effective and th it American government has
been and is democratic. This writer will examine national interest;
bases of foreign policy regarding who makes it and how it is made; demo-
cratic government, its characteristics, values and purposes.
"There is no inherent incompatibility between democratic govern-
ment and success in the sphere of external relations. "2
2 Max Beloff, Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process (Baltimore:
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NATIONAL INTEREST
The national interest exists and is s fact that cannot be de-
fined out of existence. When a national interest, either because
it is felt to be threatened or because a pressure of expectation
within a state brings it into sharp focus, becomes sufficiently
compelling for a state to seek to establish it with finality by
the active exercise of power or influence, it is delimited J>nd
particularized for a given context; it becomes an objective .3
An effective foreign policy is one th t contributes positively to a
national interest. In order to properly dissect and analyze effective for-
eign policy, the concept of national interest demands clarification. One
may begin by saying that a state constantly seeks its own "end- interests,"
that is to say, a state seeks to guarantee its self-preservation, to fortify
its security, and to promote its well-being. These end-interests are
national interests and are constants in the equation of variables comprised
of commitment, policy and objective. In this context this writer views
"objective" as B specific goal deriving from the dictates of a national in-
terest. In order to attain this goal a course of action is formulated and
adopted. This then is in essence "policy" and is subsequently supported
and furthered by implementing "commitments" which answer the "what" and
"when" of policy provided the state has the wherewithal, viz. factors of
power, to square national assets vis-a-vis commitments. Impinging on the
entire process at all levels of debate and compromise are principles that
guide our pattern of behavior and national action
—
principles conditioned
through history, tradition, and societal change (see page 4 ),
3The Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United States For-
eign Policy, 1954 (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Santa, 1954), p. 400.
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Arnold Wolfers describes the national interest as "...the policy-
designed to promote demands which are ascribed to the nation. ..the policy
that subordinates other interests to those of the nation." This description
is rather thin in that it sets policy and national interest in tantamountcy
when it should distinguish policy as a "means" and national interest the
"end," The Brookings Institute defines national interest in a more compre-
hensive manner by stating it to be the
. . .general and continuing end for which a nation acts to main-
tain its security and well-being. It embraces such matters as
the need of a society for security against aggression, the de-
sirability to a society of developing higher standards of living
and the maintenance of favorable conditions of stability both
domestically and internationally.
Both descriptions ere used here to illustrate the broad interpreta-
tion given to national interest. Hans J. Morgenthau set up national interest
in terms of power and devotes an entire work to definition and defense of
it. Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Pacificus Papers, Number III, and
later Disraeli, emphasize the reality of national interest and the paremountcy
7
of its import in the business of foreign affairs. Henry Wristom writing on one




Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,"
Political Science Quarterly , LXVII (1952), pp. 481-502.
The Brookings Institution, pp. cit . . pp. 399-401.
r
HannJ. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New
York: Knopf, 1951).
Benjamin Disraeli, "Speech in the House of Lords on the Berlin
Treaty, July 18, 1878" in Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth vV . Thompson
(eds.), Principles and Problems of International Politics (New York: Knopf,
1956), p. 54.
8 Henry M, Y^ristom, Diplomacy in a Democracy (New York: Harper
Bros., 1955).
,.
In sum then, this writer sees a national interest ss a primary
end and views tile state as an entity whose major concern is with perpetua-
tion, hence self-preservation, security, and well-being. With this view in
mind, it can be concluded that these national interests are the primary ends




One of the most critical and continuing problems facing post
World War II America is that of foreign policy. Formulation and implementa-
tion of an effective and intelligent foreign policy persists as a cornerstone
in the survival of our society, end vis-a-vis tne Communist world,
cornerstone in the survival of free society. America has been projected
into the international milieu as the free world leader without vying for
the responsibility. Our democratic institutions represent the process by
which foreign policy evolves, and the rationale upon which our institutions
function lends greatly to the substance of our foreign policy. This
rationale questions the intelligence, the efficiency, the effectiveness of
our foreign policy and it imposes the requirement that our foreign policy re-
flects the demands of the governed. Foreign policy formation must operate
within the context of democratic values and purposes and therefore the
issues of foreign affairs must be handled in terras of the organization of
our democratic government. Needless to say that in challenging and con-
fronting the pressures and threats from without, care must be exercised so
that those values are not destroyed that we are trying to safeguard within:
that is to say, the development and establishment of intelligent, efficient
and effective foreign policy must not be at the expense of democratic
values and institutions
.
Charles B. Marshall speaks of foreign policy in terms of courses
of action undertaken by a state which occur(s) beyond the span of
'lOl
\
Jurisdiction of that state. The course of action can be operable in
spheres of economics , technical/technology, cultural, military and/or
political. Although it would appear that a course of action in a particui
sphere seemingly identifies the objective of the policy, this is not
strictly the case. For example, there can be a military policy with an
economic objective and vice-versci; in fact, the dynamism of foreign
policy does not lend itself to the facile discovery of objectives by an out-
sider looking in. As a case in point, consider how apparent was the
Panama Canal as an ocean thoroughfare and how nonapparent was the ca
as an adjunct to the coastline of the United States. As an economic ob-
jective, the canal supported "American well-being," a national interest.
In 1880, however, President Hayes said, "The policy of this country is a
canal under American control. . .and virtually a part of the coastline of the
United States." The objective was then pluralized to include not only
economic, but also social, military and political; in short, it was to serve
the dual national interests of "security" and "well-being."
As illustrated, policies and objectives do not always identify
with each other by their context and by what they purport to attain. This
writer has himself reconciled the problem by viewing a policy as "political"
when the stated objective becomes secondary to an objective that appears
unannounced in the denouement, e.g., the Trojan Horse.
Without probing the depths and multiple meanings of "sovereignty,"
it seems safe to say that each state exercises freedom to choose policies
9
Charles B. Marshall, Department of itate Bulletin, March 17,
1952.
Henry M. Wriston, Naval War College Lecture Notes, Sept.
1952.
.
<mti objectives and to use them in any combination and by any technique in
furtherance of end^interests subject to formal and informal limiting factors
of action.
International relations are of two types, competitive and non-
competitive. It is from competitive relations that a state recognizes in-
formal limiting factors. These fac ors, for the most part, force states to
adopt policies which maintain an internal balance between capabilities
md objectives and an external balance of cooperation and opposition,
i.e., no state while pursuing an objective, can materially oppose all
states and therefore must cooperate with some while disputing with
others, when a state oversubscribes to disputing and thus upsets the ex-
ternal balance and exceeds capabilities internally, it (state) must then ad-
just its foreign policies or suffer defeat either economically, militarily or
politically. Informal limiting factors of action are relative with ex-
pediency and rationality, the guidelines in the balances of cooperation
and opposition, capabilities and objectives. (See page 10.)
The more recognizable but less effective limits on a state's
courses of action are those of a formal quality, international organization
and international law. International organization is today represented by
the United Nations which judges and pronounces on the actions of state ,
and uses the spectral medium of international opinion as its sounding
board. The other formal limiter of foreign policy is international law which
prescribes what is acceptable conduct among states. States recognize the
existence of formal limits to foreign policy, but the degree of conformity by
^George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Prince-
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 19S5), Chapter II.
)• ',





states varies and many succeed in avoiding the restraints.
Of the two limits to foreign policy, formal and informal, it is to
be recognized that informal limits are self-imposed and are more effective.
In a state's cost-gain calculus, an objective that will be too expensive
can in many cases be ascertained and thus the informal limit has begun
to function. Formal limits normally depend on inspection and investiga-
tion and usually on some concurrence of opinion before remedial action is
attempted. Simply conceived, the United States or any other state for that
matter, is more receptive to a self-imposed bar to action evolving through
Its own decision-making process, than one that is codified, adjudicated
or formalized by an external source.
Government
American foreign policy, by its nature and in its formulation and
execution is almost a monopoly of the Federal government. One of the
major problems in our democracy stems from the conflict between the de-
mands of a democratic people and the expert institutions of government
which possess the materials and machinery for making and executing for-
1 2
eign policy. Max Beloff 's Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process is
devoted to probing this problem. He answers in part with the idea that
the vote and public opinion, translating to the government the confidence
or censure of the people, are guides by which desires of the people are
put forth and by which governmental action will abide—as much as
possible. This section will deal with governmental institutions and
1 n
Max Beloff, Foreign Policy end the Democratic Process (Belti-







public opinion Lad their relationships to foreign policy.
The President
The President in particular and the executive branch in an over-
all capacity has primary responsibility for the formulation and execution
of foreign policy.
The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations
.. .there is no more securely established principle of con-
stitutional practice than the exclusive right of the president
to be the nation's intermediary in its dealing with other
a tions. 13
From the birth of our republic, the President has been the leader in for-
14
eign affairs. His is called, "the world's biggest job." Though the
"bigness" cannot be predicated of all leaders in all states, it is customary
in almost all states for the executive to assume primary responsibility in
the field of foreign policy; so, too, in the United States.
Presidential authority derives from Article II, section 2 of the
Constitution in which he is designated Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces; with consent of two- thirds of the Senate, he may make treat*
with foreign states; with approval of the senate, he may appoint ambassa-
dors. The President has further constitutional authority to receive am-
bassadors and thereby exercise the power of recognition. He negotiates
executive agreements, which in itself attests to his pre-eminence in for-
eign affairs and foreign policy. Congress has given to the President
Edwin S. Corwln, "Die President, Office ^nd Power (New York:
New York University Press, 1948), p. 216 and 224.
Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency (New York: The New






special grants of power, some of which in order to be effective require
the proclaiming of a national emergency; others,like those making up the
foreign aid program, ire open delegations. Both types of grints imply
the trust Congress has in the discretionary power of the President and can
be summed up by: "P degree of discretion end freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone in-
volved." 15
The President does not trovel a one-wjy street however.
Separation of powers Jind checks and balances were designed to preclu
over control by or the vesting of too much power in any one branch of the
government and certainly not in one person. They thereby apply to the
executive branch and particularly to the chief executive in that even
though he commands the armed forces, only Congress can declare war;
even though he appoints ambassador* oiid negotiates treaties, the aenate
must consent to the appointment Jiiti the ratification. One point that lies
with the President in this entire panorama of balances is his "initiative"
without which the Congress or Senate would not have anything to check or
balance
.
In addition to the powers vested in the President by the Constitu-
tion and those granted to him by Congress, he h.s accrued power in formu-
lating Uttf executing foreign policy by his national im^ge or stature. The
whole public ind Congress c^n favor recognition of a foreign state but only
the President, one person _s the notion of national representation, can ex-
tend this recognition. Another power thct has accrued to the President is
ISwilliam Hoot, Class Lecture: United States v. Curtiss Wright,




his position as "leading forrnulator *nd expounder of Public Opinion in
1 fi
the United States." DWith this power in firm tow, his is ^s Woodrow
Wilson said:
. . .his is the only voice in nation Irs. Let him once
La the admiration and confidence of the country, and no
other single force can withstand him, no combination of
forces will easily overcome him, his position tiikes the
imagination of the country. 17
Although Wilson, by example, did not verify his own allegation, his
statement remains 1 good description of the President's posture.
It c^n then be concluded that the President represents the people
nationally and internationally. Consider the names given to m=>ny of our
past foreign policies: Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt Corollary, Truman
Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine. This method of identifying foreign poli-
cies with a president uniquely indicates that the policy so named was
clearly one of the United States. It farther concurs with -an earlier allege*. -
tion of this writer that the chief executive is the prime leader in the field
of foreign policy. This follows from the fact thst since the United State*
must act as a single unit in foreign affairs due to our personal concern
with our own national interests, ~>ad also because the President is our one
important policy-maker elected by all the voters. In sum then, while the
President is by no means in sole control of foreign policy, he and that p
of the executive branch concerned with foreign policy, normally t6K.es the
initiative in foreign policy >nd assumes primary responsibility for effective
formation and execution of foreign policy. He bears ultimate responsibility
for the decisions and he sets the general policy line; he is the peak of the
policy-making mountain.
Rossiter, op. cit . , p. 22.
17
Ibid.




The multitude of imposing t ad responsibilities incumbent on
the President are distributed with varying degree within the executive branch.
The President, at the apex of the foreign policy pyramid, must rely on the
counsel, skills, and wisdom of his contemporaries; thus the organization
of the executive branch for developing foreign policy takes on extreme im-
portance. The executive branch is in the strategically supreme position to
nuke decisions. It dealt directly with other states and is thereby the
medium of formal and informal, official &nd unofficial international contact.
The executive branch is the repository of information and intelligence, the
employer of experts, and the marshalling point of policy process; i.e.
,
the elements through and upon which foreign policy decisions are made.
Gathered around the President is an elaborate staff organisation*
The agencies of the staff are of various sizes and depending on the
domestic jr*d international climate, are of varying degrees of closeness
to him. At this Juncture let it be noted that this writer does not submit the
following agencies or departments and their functions ts definitive or ev
necessary components in the structure of democratic institutions. Rather,
they are here set forth to illustrate what the American consensus views
;eptable. A word about each of the pertinent ones is in order. The
white house office operates Si the President's personal staff comprised
of administrative ~na personal assistants; Hides and secretaries, «nd e special
assistant (s) who may have e functional role in foreign affairs or '-ny design
tmilar to President Wilson's Colonel House. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
should act as principal military advisor providing the President with Strategic





Next, the Office of lefense Mobilisation h^s interest end influence
in foreign policy through the relationship of overseas iid programs to
domestic mobilization. The director is concerned with the material posi-
tion of the United States and he is adviser to the President on oil facets of
mobilization except military. The Council of Economic Advisers en-
lightens and advises the President about the American economy which is
of primary importance in foreign policy decision and implementation. The
Bureau of the Budget watches the purse and raises or lowers, approves or
disapproves, requests for appropriations and therefore is of great import on
the substance of policy. The National Security Council with its permanent
membership and flexible Ingres s-egress of pro-tem members, gathers to-
gether the most important officials concerned with foreign policy who make
recommendations to the President. Finally, the. Cni tral Intelligence
~ncy wnich is the clearing house for all intelligence data variously
gathered by other org-?. nations , etc.
The two departments of the exeautive branch of government th
will be discussed here are the Department of State and Department of De-
fense. It can be argued that every department end almost every agency,
bureau, or division within the executive branch of government has so.
influence or plays a role in foreign policy. In the past, however, it is the
Department of State that has acted as the major source of assistance to
the President in the formulation end execution of foreign policy. The
Department of Stat* has now ceased to exercise what was once nearly




In 1789 when the office of Secretary of State was established,
no detailed responsibilities in foreign affairs were set forth; probably be-
cause at that time the American policy was one of isolation and it w
viewed that this; policy would be viable forever. The Secretary was at that
time directed to assist the President as the President directed. This; im-
precise mandate provided grounds for a problem that has persisted betw*
the two from the beginning, that is the relationship between the President
and the Secretary of St »te. In question form the problem of relationship
asks, "To wh t degree is the President guided in matters of foreign
policy 7 " For example, consider relations, between Franklin Roosevelt and
Cordell Hull. Hull, as Secretary of State, was accorded gre it powers in
foreign affairs before World War II while the President grappled with
domestic issues, but by 1940, the President virtually became his own
Secretary of St-te. - nother case in point, though not so pronounced, is
that of John Foster Dulles.
There is no hard and fast rule about this relationship, but at
times, the Secretary of State is usually of great if not decisive infiuem
in foreign policy. Even when the President reserves to himself the making
of the important decisions on foreign policy, his picture of reality may well
be what the Secretary of State supplies him, *.nd a moment's reflection will
mike obvious that this picture will possibly be more influential in the de-
termination of policy than the predispositions of the President.
As mentioned earlier in this discussion, the Department of State
is now a medium of cooperative action. This cooperative action must ex-
tend beyond departmental walls for one good re < son: The departmental
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economic, etc., an s, viz. Western Europe, Latin iet
Union, Africa, etc. Decisions, progt policies of anything but
the narrowest scope in either field necessarily involve the other plus out-
side fields for m iteriels of implementation and so forth. If the Depdrtment
of State c atinuously operate and serve the principle of coordinate
ion, it will have found its niche in the pyramid of foreign policy.
The other department highly concerned and highly influential in
foreign policy is the Department of Defense. Since World War II, U
continued inclusion of the military viewpoint in foreign policy formulation
represents a significant but not unwarranted procedural change. 18 It is
manifest that as long as there is a clear threat of military involvement in the
international milieu, military consideration in any proposed foreign policy
cannot be ignored. The policy itself m^y evolve to counter a precipitous
military incursion allowing for no other feasible course of action. k§ an
aside, it is gratifying to review active military participation aa foreign
policy since World War II and ascribe to these courses of action political
objectives rather than the "legalistic-moralistic" and "punitive" stigm
19
that G.F. Kennan predicates of military action in the past. The cases to
be cited ere of course Korea, Lebanon, Cubs &n6 South East Asia. A s a
final note in this vein, this writer feels that punitive action is not a thing
of the past but remains a very real imd valid course of action in answer to
a wanton act by aa aggressor where no other rebuttal will suffice.
18
Burton M. Sapin ond Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military
in American Foreign Policy (Garden oity: Coubledey, 1954/
.
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-19 oQ (Chicago:




The Department of Defense is Integra ted in foreign policy formui -
tion and implementation at all levels of process and has the Job of maintain-
ing the military in a position of foreign policy execution on - continuing
b.)Sis. jecreti;ry of Defense has become position of augmented power and
influence like none other in "vmeric-m history. He has the delegated
command of the huge military budget *n& his reconciliation of problems and
decisions inject into many facets of foreign policy formulation and imple-
mentation. This has been a changing role toward more responsibility and
more decision-making capability, but it must be realized that his role in
the foreign policy process and his decisions in the field of foreign affairs
are with the sanction of the President who extends the power through dele-
gation and the Congress which extends the power through appropriation.
a finale to this discussion of the executive branch of govern-
ment, it is this writer's opinion that the President is the only person who
can make and ultimately be held accountable for foreign policy. It is to
be realized th>t ail men in position of responsibility and trust (and scores
of them low in the hierarchy) make decisions, but the authority is derived
from the President who alone is accountable. Harry Trurnan made si state-
ment about the National security Council regarding decisions and policy which
is felt to be applicable to all departments, bureaus, ?>nd agencies; to :>il men
in the executive branch less the President:
Policy itself has to come down from the President, as all
final decisions have to be made by him. A vote in the
National Security Council is merely a procedural step. It
never decides policy. That can be done only with the
President's .jpprovsl . 2
Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Double-
day j.ad Co. , 19 56), p» 53.
'.»"..'/'•:
'J *>,... l&ti r?" .' . ,y „ • • -j -> .,p »;.
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Congress
The Congress of the United States has moved from a secondary
position in the field of foreign policy to one of m*jor importance. This is
liallenging statement t.nd should be covered by the qualification t.i
since foreign policy has come to take up so much of our mass media and
mass monies, Congress has moved along and into the spotlight as the
"keeper of the purse. " This is not to imply equality with the executive
branch in foreign policy but it means that those powers at Congressional
>oscl in foreign policy have been sharpened and toned to meet the con-
tinuing demands of the awakening democratic public on one hand and the
crucially important field of foreign policy on the other. Conceptually
stated. Congress' role in foreign policy is one of reaction whereby it
amends, negate^ or passes those policy decisions already taken by the
President.
As a body of reflection and debate, Congress necessarily moves
slowly weighing the opinions of |&i individual members, its specially or
regularly constituted committees, and public opinion for which congressmen
claim to have an ->cute sensitivity. Operation of our system of checks and
balances ind the lack of any clear procedure for initiative in foreign policy
have made Congress the reactive body it Is and hyve further forced Con-
gress into a position of "watchdog on the executive branch.
Congressional power derives from the Constitution in confirn-
tion und KQm*nt, legislation and ±ppropriati.n. This power is manifest
through Congressional action on American programs of military and
tnomlc aid, money appropriations, and treaty reconciliations.





Congress in foreign affairs. The legal basis or authorization for the
expenditure is the first step followed by the actual appropriation which
provides funds for implementing the authorization. Besides both houses
individually, the foreign relations committees nd appropriations com-
mittees of the houses have primary interest in appropriations wherein
the foreign relations committees consider the substance of the policy and
the appropriations committees consider the money request per se. This
activity supports cm intracongressional check system in that policy sub-
stance is investigated and funding is weighed against domestic needs,
national debt, and borrowing capabilities. In short, comprehensive
purse control gives Congress its most formidable incursive power in
formulation of foreign policy. It should be noted that Congressmen are
desirous of political, economic and military success in foreign affairs
and therefore in these affairs must be presumed to act in the country's
best interests.
Before a foreign policy can be carried out, there is normally the a
requirement for legislation. This is the second important tfflea of partici-
pation *nd is on a more vis-a-vis basis with foreign policy than is funding.
Congress negates, passes or amends the bill that delineates the policy.
In the case of amendment the policy reverts to the executive for .action.
In order to plumb Congressional feeling and predisposition on policy, the
executive branch maintains a liason, usually in the character of a spec;
assistant who sets out the proposition and whose prime mission is one of
cooperation if possible, information at least, bmall scale executive-
legislative consultations also have a role in liason with like goals.
The third crnd final major area of participation is the Senate's
.
22
constitutional power to approve treaties with two-thirds concurrence md
to confirm executive appointments which includes the entire foreign service
officer corps .^ad executive cabinet. Disapproval of ./ in essence
constitutes B veto end renders void a project of no small expense .>n-
jern. In order to permit speed snd secrecy, the President hai been granted
specicl power to engage in executive agreements with foreign
already mentioned in this discussion.
It hardly seems necessary to emphasise the importance of the
foregoing powers in foreign policy. Congress plays the part of the honest
broker, the taskmaster, the watchdog. It forces the executive branch to
constantly review budgetary designs not only in those areas clearly marked
foreign policy, but also in Sfftftl of indirect contributions to foreign policy
and in the military, our court of last resort in foreign policy. Investigative
power has sharpened the focus of Congressmen as participants in foreign
policy and has trimmed away much of the mystery that attended previous
informational shortcomings. Finally, the congressional resolution answers
the chief executive in terms of Congress' predisposition znd public
opinion regarding c*ny proposition, in this case specifically foreign policy,
e.g., Vandenberg Resolution, 1949.
Public Opinion
Bryce said: "Public opinion is commonly used to denote the
aggregate of views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the
21
community." These "matters" then include foreign affairs and thereto,
2 1
James Bryce in Public Opinion and Propaganda, D, Katft, D.
Cartwright, 8. Eldersveld, A. McClung Lee (eds.) (New York: Dryden







foreign policy. The questions that natur .?," which men in par-
ticular and what affect ::hese aggregate views? "
In answer to these ions, one must consider the stratification
of our citizenry. James Rosenau delineates his ide<j of the stratified pub-
lic as the mass public, or Gabriel Mmond's general public, the middle
22
stratum attentive public and the opinion-making public which Almond
23
calls "elites." The illustration
Jt right is also Almond's con-
ception adapted to visual ref-
erence .
The Mass Public is
"75 to 90 per cent of the
24
adult population which has
no opportunity or desire to
enter or affect the decision
and policy-making process.
This group has opinion but
not that structured opinion
evolving te an evaluative
process.
ST^TVF^rVTVO^ ojt TAfe Pvjftuvc
2 James Rosenau , Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York:
Random House, 1861), pp. 33-34.
23
Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New
York: Praeger, 1951), Chapter 5.
24






j^tfi/9 5>/yr ^o t?o/77u/=?/Ta#T£
cinic
24
"Their response of foreign policy matters is less one of in-
tellect and more one of emotion; less one of opinion and more one of
mood, of generalized superficial, and undisciplined feelings which
easily fluctuate from one extreme to another. . . . ° This writer in
general agrees with Roseman's allegations but finds one point deserving
of comment. The percentage figures for the mass public are very close to
those used by Martin Kriesberg in 1948. The frightening aspect is the
implication that since 1S48, the great advances in communications and
mass media have failed to enlighten an appreciable portion of what is called
the "Mass Public." This writer does not concede the point.
The second stratum is that of the Attentive Public: those opinion
holders who would participate but &re lacking in technical access and
opportunity. If it can be said that the mass public sets the precincts
within which foreign policy will operate, the attentive public evaluates
foreign affairs based on informational data and evaluates the substance of
foreign policy. Participation from this stratum is that of opinion presenta-
tion in the form of letters, petitions, meetings, etc. Because theirs is
opinion based on evluation and reason as opposed to emotion (though they
are not free of emotion nor is anyone else), they temper the moods created
by the mass public. Their letters and communications in general are valid
indications to the decision maker that his choice of foreign policy is im-
pinging on the enlightened and has not peremptorily wakened the slumbering
giant, the mass public.
9 Ft
Martin Kriesberg, M D rk Areas of Ignorance" in Public Opinion
and Foreign Policy , L. Market (ed.) (New York: Harper and Bros. 1949),
p. 51.
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The opinion-making public is the upper stratum of the pyre mid.
It influences through respective societal positions the other two strata
either by local or national participation. Opinion makers are not
necessarily decision makers, as in the case of professors r.nd writers,
but they can be, as in the case of Congressmen and officers of the Execu-
tive Branch.
The President and Congressmen as opinion-makers , decision-
makers, policy-makers, are the two most sensitive, yet effective posi-
tions in the foreign policy-democratic government complex of problems
.
They, the President in particular, on a national scale, reach out to all
strata of the public via mass media— speeches, publications, etc. --and
submit policy in terms of objectives that will stimulate support or at least
acceptance. This is the first step in a four step process of public
opinion. It is then the goal that other opinion makers will give their
strategic support and thus proliferate policy dissemination. The attentive
public will evaluate the policy and will further act as conveyors to the mass
27public which will have been exposed to multiple stimulations. The mass
public variously tests the policy and by its reaction sets a mood which is
the heart and soul of public opinion poles, advertising, man-on-the-street
interviews and also the acceptability or not of a foreign policy as the answer
for which the administration wants support or at least information. It is to
be noted that a neat four-step process, distinguishable at each juncture,
dssessible in each strata, is not always the case. Rather, the process is
Hkfened ta spontaneous combustion wherein the original introduction of the
Idea adapted from the four- step flow. Rosenau, op. cit. , p. 8.
,:
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situation is reflected by an immediate mood of the mass public followed
by the reinforce merits of other opinion make; articulation by the
attentive public—oil in a very short, almost immediate period of time.
Wf
. Pearl Harbor to Illustrate ths spontaneity of immediate mood,
reinforcement* articulation, and sustaining mood,wherein all stratum were
current in accepting or rather demanding war as a course of action.
It is at this writing, inconceivable that even if Pearl Harbor had beer
gross mistake followed by apologies et t»l. , that the mood of the mass
public -would nave permitted any other foreign policy but war. Similarly,
though not as person?], end extending over & longer period of time was the
process by which President McKinley acquiesced to a war with Spain.
The masa public was conditioned ind finally reacted to the U.S.S. Maine
incident. % final example is that of President Roosevelt's emasculation
of the Neutrality &etS« one of Congress* most apparent ventures into for-
eign policy "initiative." There are many more: President Truman ;md
Korea; President Kennedy and Cuba which, from this writer's viewpoint,
may become a classic in foreign policy strategy at least in preparation
and initial presentation to the public.
la reconsidering Bryce's definition, a final note is in order.
The aggregate view(s) are a product of conditioning, timing, and presenta-
tion; of impingement by prejudice, biss, and ignorance; of reconciliation
by mood, interest, and cognitive evaluation. This occurs first down and
then bock up the strata of our society and finally emerges as a force,
den: n j force in foreign policy. "I can do anything with Public Opinion,
but nothing without it or against it." 28
2 8
Abraham Lincoln from Rossiter, op. cit ., p. 48.
1'
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In external policies as at home, the fundamentals of foreign
policy are determined by public opinion, by the set of pre-
suppositions, partly conscious : nJ partly unconscious, with
which Congress and President alike must reckon at every
nov teclsion making process, 29
29
Max Beloif, "Foundations d American Policy" in The Spectator ,




Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type
of institutional arrangement for arriving at political— legislative
and administrative— decisions and hence incapable of being
on end in itself, irrepective of what decisions it wiii proa ..
under given historical conditions . And this must be the starting
point of any attempt at defining it.30
Thus far this writer has set before the reader foreign policy, the
institutions and men of American government who make foreign policy, and
the public opinion that affects foreign policy. In this chapter the goal is
to advance the concept that ours is a democratic government by examining
ideas and results and ascertaining whether or not these ideas and products
ascribe to our government. This is then a grammar of fundamentals, be-
cause it is in fundamentals, both in interpretation and application, that
one form of government differs from another. It is in searching the funda-
mentals that we discover why our democratic government has sustained
and will continue to.
In order to discuss government, democratic government in particu-
lar, one must use some plane of reference. Governmental and political
systems are never mutually exclusive nor are they isolated as pure types.
For purposes of analysis then, one can conceive a qualitative spectrum of
governments using as the common denominator, control of the citizenry.
At one end of the spectrum is the totalitarian government wherein control is
exercised over every facet of a citizen's being: complete domination. At
the other end of the spectrum should therefore be a government exercising
on
J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New




least control, on the order of Jefferson's ". . .Government that governs
least, governs best." Since he was talking democratic government, let us
say that antipodal to totalitarianism is popularly elected democratic govern-
ment. The ideal of this type of government is Athenian democracy which is
constantly used as Qualitative measure of democracies but which, to this
writer, is a false standard of excellence considering that Athenian "rule by
the people" meant adult male citizens comprising a small proportion of a
small population in a small state. It was said:
No people of magnitude to be called a nation has ever,
in strictness, governed itself; the utmost which appears
to be attainable under the conditions of human life, is th ^t
it should choose its governors and that it should on select
occasions bear directly on their action. 31
What this writer wishes to establish at this juncture is that the existence
of democracy in any system is one of degree. It is a subjective quality
wherein states ' governments appropriate the name because it is honorific
and persuasive, because it mouses favorable feelings and in many states
is a veneer to a despicable base. In the spectrum, once again, one can
place relatively, the government of every extent state. It is surprising
how many ascribe to the democratic label: China calls itself Centralized
Democracy; the Soviet Union as do the states of Eastern Europe call them-
selves People's Democracies; historically, Hitler called Germany Real
Democracy, and Mussolini naturally said that Italy was an organized,
centralized, authoritarian Democracy.
If ,in this tyranny of words, one can say that 8 Democracy has
democratic government, then this writer dares to say that the United States
31
Michael Goodwin (ed.), 19th Century Opinion cited in An In-
troduction to Democratic Theory, H.B. Mayo (New York: Oxford University







is a Democracy having democratic government: that the citizens of this
democratic government choose their governors and judge them at each
election and therefore designate wh-t kind of democratic government it is
to be in order to meet the needs of the time and attending circumstances.
What then in generic terms distinguishes a truly democratic
government from others? It is
. . .one that is marked by many popular disagreements and
disputes about policies , where all policies are made in
context of political freedoms, and where the final decisions
of government are made by representatives freely elected on
wide, usually universal, suffrage. . . .It is the most politic
of all systems, in that disputes are open and continuous, going
©*» between elections as well ss during campaigns, and often




To this writer, the ?bove quote represents a thumbnail sketch of the
American democratic system. Let us look at the ideas that sustain our
system.
Political equality is one of the ideas. It is made manifest by the
equality of all adult citizens in voting wherein every adult citizen has the
vote, or at least the federal government is taking steps to ensure this to
be and each singular vote from each individual counts equally. This ic<
is one that is common to Athenian and modern democratic governments ex-
cept that the one democracy today, used by critics of the American form in
terms of comparison, does not subscribe to female suffrage. This is of
course only one criterion whereby one state may rate higher than others
but it is one that sustains in the American form and is constantly being
improved
.




A natural concomitant to the vote is popular control of the policy
makers without which the "vote" would be near meaningless. The institu-
tional embodiment of this ides is the election whereby representatives who
would be policy makers are freely chosen. These then become the govern-
ment and counterpoised to them are those anxious to replace: both are
sensitive to public opinion; both operate with a wide range of political
freedoms through which the public exerts continuing influence as well as
distinct periodic control. The normative reason for popular control is simply
that political authority should emanate from the people rather than from
another political source.
In company with the foregoing ideas is that the decision of the
majority prevails. It is recognized as substance from the vote, where the
majority chooses, and from popular control which bespeaks consent of the
governed in majority. The basis for this idea is Aristotelian in that the
majority is more likely to be right or in a modem context, "Democracy is
the recurrent suspicion that more than half of the people are right more than
33
half of the time." It must be conceded that the "majority" idea is not
absolute or without fault and by that same token/ neither are the ideas of
the "vote" or "popular control." Their shortcomings are readily apparent
inasmuch as voting in some areas is reluctantly allowed and if possible
disallowed; "popular control" is sometimes marginal, if at all, when public
interest and resultant public opinion are dormant, most conspicuously in
our relations with other nations; majority decisions do prevail but they are
not always meet and just because out of context they need only be so








Along with the foregoing ideas evolve institutional mechanisms
of democratic government in the form of the political party, and defined
by Burke as, ".
. .3 body of men united for promoting by their joint en-
deavors the national interests, upon some particular principle on which
they ore all agreed." Our very early history documents the antipathy for
political parties but with extension of the franchise and political freedoms,
political parties were born, grew, and are recognized as valuable and
necessary in the democratic scheme of government: ". . .experience gives
no ground for believing that we can have political democracy at the a
35
national level without at least two parties." Because we are a government
that weighs and reckons with opinion and because our electorate demands
organization for articulation and vocalization of its desires, political
parties sustain. In simplest terms, parties gather the votes, but over-
simplification does an injustice to parties per se at it does to other
descriptives like "government of the people," "universal franchise" and
obviously "democracy."
Parties, in pursuing their functions, contribute to democratic
government in that they afford the voter a choice of political programs,
they stimulate and help evoke a popular will, they halp to determine the
outcome of policy making. The great many opinions that pervade our
national scene either through mood, emotion, interest, or cognitive evaluation
would never amalgamate into a focalized two-opinion camp if parties did not
set forth platforms by which the majority within our societal strata might
Edmund Burke cited in The People and the Constitution by C.S.
Emden(New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 121.
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personally identify. More mundane functions of political parties include
presentation of candidates, political education of the public, opposition
to the present government through criticism and debate, and preparation
of counterpoised representatives for the respective election year(s)
.
The existence of political opposition—-by individuals
end groups, by the press, and above all, by organized
parties—is the litmus-paper test of democracy. . . .One
can take the trimmings of democracy, especially the
voting end popular support, but the opposition of party,
press, etc., cannot be faked .36
Concluding these comments, it can be said that, "Democratic government
37
is party government and parties help to keep the government democrQtic."
The implemented ideas of democratic government ^.nd the
mechanisms of i democracy can be placed into a mosaic of the over-all
scheme. Parties set out the programs or platforms of the candidates
free election is conducted in which chosen candidates become representa-
tives of the people; as representatives, they make decisions and formulate
policy tempered by the political freedoms of the people and criticism and
opposition of the counterpoised candidates: the result is i popularly
elected democratic government subject to electorate control.
Relating to Democracy alone, but for purposes of thi3 writer,
equally attrituble to democratic government, Schumpeter's earlier quotation
38
in part said, " . . .incapable of being on end in itself." Regarding demo-
cratic government then, it, like a machine or process, must have -jn end
product justifiable by terms of its cost and energies of operation. History
is a documentation of cost both in men, money and materials. The energies
p. 147.
37
Suzanne Labin, The Secret of Democracy , cited in Mayo, op. cit .,
Mayo, op . cit . , p. 148.
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of operation can be viewed by looking around one's self today and
calculating the man-hours devoted to the operation of government. These
are material results. Let us consider the results as statements of valued
In our society as in all others, conflicts germinate and are trans-
ported by opinions, interests or moods. We look at these conflicts
legitimate and purposive ^nd thusly we look to negotiation, mediation but
not to intimidation or force (for the most part) to reconcile them. This is
then, the voluntary adjustment of disputes.
Peaceful change in a changing society does not seem to apply when
one views integration problems on the national scene and threatened war on
the international scene. When one accepts civil rights as only a singular
aspect of our changing society and reckons that we make big of our
shortcomings end little of our advances and if we isolate the problem and
particularize the participants, it is a thorn in the eagle's foot, painful but
by no means debilitating. Internationally we ere a nation of once removed
isolationists. Our walls bristle with guns, the largest armory in our
country's history. Yet, history tells its own story of a nation that has
needed violent shoves and violent stimulation to be forced to turn to the
sword and shield. It is incontrovertible that the United States has, does,
and will go to great lengths to settle differences short of war. Our's is
an era of great social change and history twenty years or a hundred years
from now will be the final judge of our disposition for peaceful change,
success or failure.
39




One of the outstanding facets of American democracy is its
orderly succession of rulers. Our state presides over peaceful recon-
ciliation of conflicts .md grapples to further peaceful societal change but
it has seemingly solved the problem of the orderly succession of rulers.
Discussing free elections and orderly succession, a resultant, Judge
Learned Hand wrote:
It seems to me, with all its defects, our system does just
that. For abuse it as you will, it gives a bloodless measure
of social forces. . .a means of continuity, a principle of
stability, a relief from the paralyzing terror of revolution .40
Because the majority vote (at least) is the method by which
legislation, much of policy, and decisions in general are reached, and be-
cause legislation on a national scale pertains to the majority in general,
one can question the position of the minority. Can the minority be construed
as being coerced? In answer it can be alleged that even those who are
favored by legislation, for the most part, do not receive everything desired.
This in itself represents a rejection or a defeat of sorts. Other defeats,
particularly in elections accompanied by campaigns, are mollified through
a win-lose calculus. Those identifying with a party recognize the contest
character of the election and recognize that they had put their best foot
forward but did not suceed. In essence, the acceptance of political defeat
by principals, and acceptance of legislation as binding is an identifying feature
of political discipline, responsibility or willing obedience.
The final resultant of our democratic government and what might
rightly be called a virtue is the attainment of justice. Each day it is
apparent that justice is high on our scale of values. The democratic system
p. 222.
40






does not in all cases pre elude injustice from occurring, but rather
recognizes it as such and attempts to prevent its recurrence. This is
accomplished for the most part by established procedural safeguards
institutionalized in our court and law enforcement system. Further,
injustice is less likely to occur in our milieu because political freedoms
are not suppressed. Finolly, political compromise by adjustment of con-
flicting claims greatly reduces the areas where injustice could occur be-
cause the absoluteness of right or wrong is modified by reconciliation of
the problem, 'braham Lincoln summed up the attainment of justice in 5
few short words . It also touches on other aspects of democratic govern-
ment: majority principle, good governors, representative government and
government of the people, by the people and for the people: " . . .faith
in the ultimate justice of the people.





Restated, the question to have been answered is, "Are viable
democratic government and effective foreign policy irreconcilable aims?
In the American context of the question, this writer is of the opinion that
we h»ve both effective foreign policy and viable democratic government.
Initially this writer discussed the definition of foreign policy,
i.e., what it is, and discussed it in relation to its co-actors as they
apply to the maintenance and furtherance of our national interests. It h
been shown that foreign policy, its formulation and implementation, re-
sults from democratic process in our institutions; that those who formulate
foreign policy are subject to the healthy "checks and balances" pressures
causing careful evaluation of the course of action in terms of internal and
external needs. The President has been discussed as the prime initiator
in the foreign policy process. The Executive branch completes this phase
by answering for him, "Can we do it?" (i.e., feasibility), and "Will it
accomplish what is desired?" (i.e., suitability). However, it is the chief
executive who makes the final decision and bears ultimate responsibility
for success or failure. Congress oper tes as the watchdog on foreign
policy in normal foreign relations, by assuring, through control of the purse,
that our external commitments do not endanger or bankrupt our national
capabilities. Both the President and Congress function on the bases established
in the Constitution but interpretation of the needs of the time have stimulated
the accordance of extra powers to the President. This delegation of powers
to the President by Congress helps us to ascertain the viability of our
-
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democratic government because it indicates that we have not stagnated,
t we have shown a willingness to change when change is in order, re-
luctantly and guardedly, but positively. Finally, in this section was dis-
cussed public opinion, its evolution in both the mass public stratum
opinion-making stratum and its travels both up and down the public
opinion pyramid. The quintessence of this discussion of public opinion is
that the aggregate "view or opinion is not a product of any one strata but is
synthesized from all three. The mass public manifests itself as a mood
which sets the precincts within which courses of action may operate as
acceptable. The mood is important because it indicates how the public
will receive foreign policy and therefore bears heavily on the disposition
Congress assumes in appropriation considerations. In foreign policy
matters, the President prepares the mess and attentive public by many de-
vices, primarily mass media, makes a pronouncement, and waits for the
reaction. It is this reaction as an aggregate view that is the public
opinion and exerts itself on foreign policy.
It was alleged that democratic government, democracy in a more
comprehensive sense, is relativistic and subjective-;. There are ideas that
underlay a government claiming democratic status .and those ideas are purt
of the rationale of American government. From democratic government come
resultants that indicate the degree of democracy attained. Viability can be
ascribed to that democratic government that encourages and provides an
environment where the resultants can be improved; a government that does
not stagnate. This is the American government.
It cannot be asserted that effective foreign policies have always







War I, leading to the great depression and allowing Fsscism-Naziism,
attest to this fact. This does not prove the case against viable democratic
government and effective foreign policy. For one thing, there is no quaran-
tee that had the Central Powers won the war they would have chosen wiser
cou if action end certainly the world would not have been better for it.
Cur policy of war was effective but our subsequent policy of peace was not.
When reviewing merican foreign policy, one cannot help but be
struck by the fact that every major course of action in foreign affairs has
been criticized, and each age has considered itself as one beset by
crises on the international scene. Yet, our major foreign policies have
served their purpose: isolationism served this nation in its early, weak
yeors and permitted prodigous advance and expansionism served by aug-
menting this notion's size threefold.
Now we are faced with great responsibilities of international
character. Since 1949 this nation has accepted an outlook of intern -itional-
ism and has progressed from adolescence to adulthood. There have been
setbacks and there have been regressions but this government of one hundred
ind eighty years will continue to provide the sustaining guidance in foreign
affairs
.
He (Bryce) did not accept the view that democracies
were by their nature incapable of generating an intelligent
and realistic view of where their interests lay or that they
were incapable of holding fast to a consistent line of
policy. He believed that the contrary could be demonstr.ted
. . .by the record of the United States ... ,42
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